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The Non-Contractual Nature of  
Privacy Policies and a New Critique  
of the Notice and Choice Privacy 
Protection Model 
Thomas B. Norton* 
Notice and Choice is the model for protecting privacy online in the 
United States. Under the model, users of online services are given notice 
about services information and privacy practices in the form of privacy 
policies. Based on this information, users can choose whether to use par-
ticular online services and whether to exercise any options for protecting 
their privacy that the services might offer. 
In theory, Notice and Choice seems like a sound regulatory mechan-
ism. Indeed, state and federal regulatory agencies prefer the model as a 
basis for privacy enforcement action. But Notice and Choice faces harsh 
criticism from privacy advocates. This Note adds a new critique to the 
list—that Notice and Choice leaves individual consumers who are af-
fected by privacy policy breaches, legally, empty-handed. This is because 
website privacy policies—the principal mechanism for effectuating No-
tice and Choice—are generally not considered to be legally binding 
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agreements. As a result, individuals’ contract theory-based actions 
against companies for privacy policy breaches almost categorically fail. 
As a result, the users of online services are largely left without individual 
redress for privacy policy breaches. 
Much has been written about Notice and Choice, and even more has 
been written about online contracting. Yet, like Notice and Choice and 
contract theory themselves, these two bodies of scholarship remain misa-
ligned. This Note fills that gap by addressing Notice and Choice in the 
context of contracts, and offers alternative solutions to give individuals 
the opportunity to seek redress in the Notice and Choice scheme through 
contract theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you bought a plane ticket online. To complete 
your order, you provided the airline with your name, address, 
phone number, credit card number, and other sensitive personal 
information. Before you did this, you read the airline’s privacy pol-
icy, which promised that the airline would not share any of your 
information with third parties. This promise gave you faith that you 
could safely entrust the airline with your information. 
Months later, the Department of Defense hired a data analytics 
company to build a model for identifying individuals who might 
pose a threat to military facilities. At the Transportation Security 
Administration’s urging, the airline from whom you have bought 
your ticket shared your information, and the information of other 
customers, with the data analytics company in blatant violation of 
the airline’s privacy policy. 
Based on the privacy policy you read, you expected that your 
personal information would not be transferred in this way. You sue 
the airline for breaching the policy. You believe you will win be-
cause the airline made a promise to not share your personal infor-
mation, and it broke that promise. But in reality, you might not 
have it so easy. 
The Internet has become a tool that billions of people around 
the world use every day to work, play, shop, socialize, and learn. 
Rapidly evolving technologies enable companies to track users on-
line and collect ever-more-granular information about their Inter-
net use habits—from details about website browsing history to 
records of individual keystrokes and clicks.1 Websites and other 
providers of online services collect and use this information for 
their own commercial gain.2 
But there is a trade-off: Websites and online services often offer 
free content and personalized services to individuals in exchange 
for sharing personal information.3 This model of commerce poses 
risks, however; it can lead to discrimination (based on price or oth-
er factors) or can result in non-quantifiable harms, such as the ex-
                                                                                                                            
1 See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503. 
2 See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
3 Id. 
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posure of sensitive personal information.4 For these reasons, signif-
icant policy-making efforts have been expended to establish boun-
daries for the collection and use of personal information.5 
Despite such efforts, the United States has not adopted a com-
prehensive privacy law.6 Instead, a patchwork quilt of federal and 
state laws narrowly targeted to specific sectors and actors establish 
privacy rules.7 However, individuals’ personal information col-
lected by websites and online services is not protected by these in-
dustry-specific laws; instead, it is protected by a self-regulatory re-
gime referred to as “Notice and Choice.”8 
Under the Notice and Choice model, websites or online servic-
es provide individuals with disclosure about their information prac-
tices, such as those pertaining to data collection, use, sharing, and 
security.9 This knowledge, in turn, empowers individuals to make 
choices with respect to whether and how they will use the service.10 
                                                                                                                            
4 See Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy, in 
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 76, 83 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); see also 
Kim Zetter, The Year’s 11 Biggest Hacks, from Ashley Madison to OPM, WIRED (Dec. 23, 
2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/the-years-11-biggest-hacks-from-
ashley-madison-to-opm/ [https://perma.cc/3AN6-TFP6]. 
5 See, e.g., Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 
(Supp. 2015). 
6 See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ AND JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF 
U.S. DATA PROTECTION 7–10 (1996). 
7 See id.; Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier 
for Individual Rights, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208–10 (1992). For example, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), protects 
personally identifiable health information and provides patients with a host of rights 
regarding that information by imposing layered privacy safeguards. Similarly, the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012), protects information held by credit 
reporting agencies by giving consumers the right to access, dispute, and correct 
information about them. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), limits 
government access to private information that is stored and transmitted on the Internet. 
8 See infra Section II.A. 
9 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure Regulation 
Work? An Empirical Study of Privacy Policies 2–3 (Apr. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
10 See id. 
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Privacy policies are the primary mechanism for ensuring valid 
Notice and Choice.11 Websites and online services use privacy poli-
cies to disclose their information practices.12 As this Note explains, 
however, privacy policies generally lack contractually binding ef-
fect.13 This means that in the event of a privacy policy breach, users 
are unable to seek redress by relying on contract theories.14 This 
Note argues that this reality undermines Notice and Choice by 
running contrary to its objectives and rationales.15 
The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes what privacy 
policies are, what they are meant to do, and the main critiques pri-
vacy policies face, including the fact that courts tend to interpret 
privacy policies as non-binding agreements. It concludes by dis-
cussing the practical effects of this state of affairs. Part II outlines 
the Notice and Choice regime and its history before arguing that 
privacy policies’ non-contractual, non-binding nature is incongru-
ent with Notice and Choice and its rationales and objectives. Part 
III offers potential solutions for this disconnect, including form-
based and technology-based approaches. 
I. NON-CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY POLICIES 
This Part examines the enforceability of privacy policies as 
binding, contractual agreements. First, it describes privacy policies 
generally in terms of purpose and form. Next, it offers critiques of 
privacy policies. Then, the Part analyzes why contract claims 
founded on privacy policy breaches typically fail, and discusses the 
practical implications of this state of affairs. 
A. Privacy Policies Generally 
We live in a global economy supported by a common currency: 
information.16 The companies we interact with online compile 
                                                                                                                            
11 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
12 Id. 
13 See discussion infra Section I.C. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See generally William D. Eggers et al., Data as the New Currency, DELOITTE REV., July 
24, 2013, at 18, 20–21. 
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massive quantities of data about their customers.17 When we use 
allegedly “free” services—for example, those provided by 
Google—we pay for those services by enabling the service provider 
to build a database of information about our searches, online activi-
ty, and personal information.18 The service provider may then leve-
rage this data for commercial gain.19 
Privacy policies are meant to address how a company such as 
Google handles customer information. Generally, privacy policies 
are “comprehensive disclosure[s]” describing how websites and 
online services handle their users’ information.20 Though a privacy 
policy’s precise content depends on a company’s specific informa-
tion practices, privacy policies typically include disclosures of how 
companies collect, use, disclose, retain, and manage customer in-
formation.21 
Privacy policies are meant to increase the transparency of web-
sites’ information practices so that users are aware of those prac-
tices.22 These policies often suggest that users refrain from using 
the website or service if they disagree with the policy terms.23 Put 
another way, privacy policies provide users with notice of a web-
site’s information practices. With this notice, users can make a 
                                                                                                                            
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Companies perform large-scale analytics on their databases to convert data into 
actionable knowledge. See Thomas H. Davenport et al., Data to Knowledge to Results: 
Building an Analytic Capability, 43 CAL. MGMT. REV., no. 2, Winter 2001, at 117, 128. For 
example, companies use consumer data to deliver advertisements to individual consumers 
based on their online behavior. One recent estimate suggests that online advertising is a 
$23 billion per year industry. See INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, INTERNET 
ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT 3 (2009), http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_PwC_ 
2008_full_year.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY2H-9TFV]; see also Darrell Etherington, Google 
Stops Mining Education Gmail and Google Apps Accounts for Ad Targeting, TECHCRUNCH, 
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/30/google-stops-mining-education-
gmail-and-google-apps-accounts-for-ad-targeting/ [https://perma.cc/3ARK-3RNE]. 
20 Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Contractual Nature of Online Policies Remains 
Unsettled, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 2010, at 2. 
21 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/rights/ 
privacy/policy/privacy-policy.html [https://perma.cc/ZK9Z-DNBY] (last updated June 
10, 2015). 
22 See Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over 
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 596 (2007). 
23 Id. 
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choice about whether to use the website or service, depending on 
how its information practices comport with their personal privacy 
preferences. This model is referred to as “Notice and Choice,” 
and it is the preferred method for protecting privacy online in the 
United States.24 
Today, nearly all companies have a privacy policy.25 Though 
not required by law except in certain circumstances (e.g., to comply 
with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act26 (“COPPA”)), 
privacy policies are de facto mandatory. In 2003, California 
enacted the California Online Privacy Protection Act27 (“CalOP-
PA”), which requires that operators of commercial websites that 
collect personal information from California residents post a priva-
cy notice that fulfills certain requirements.28 Because online busi-
nesses typically serve a national audience, despite the physical loca-
tion of users, the California law effectively imposes a requirement 
that all entities conducting business online in the United States 
post a privacy policy. 
B. Common Privacy Policy Critiques 
Privacy policies face a number of critiques. First, people rarely 
read or even see online privacy policies.29 Those that attempt to 
                                                                                                                            
24 Notice and Choice will be more thoroughly described infra Section II.A. 
25 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 594 (2014). According to Professor Haynes: “In 1998, 
only 2% of all websites had some form of privacy notices, and in 1999, eighteen of the top 
100 shopping sites did not display a privacy policy. By 2001, virtually all of the most 
popular commercial websites had privacy notices. . . .” Haynes, supra note 22, at 593–94. 
26 COPPA requires that online services which collect information from children under 
13 obtain parental consent to such collection after posting “a prominent and clearly 
labeled link to an online notice of its information practices with regard to children on the 
home or landing page or screen of its Web site or online service, and, at each area of the 
Web site or online service where personal information is collected from children.” FTC 
Commercial Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(d) (2016). 
27 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2014). 
28 The statute requires that an operator of commercial websites or online services that 
collect personally identifiable information about individual consumers residing in 
California “conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site, or in the case of an 
operator of an online service, make that policy available” via “reasonably accessible 
means of making the privacy policy available for consumers of the online service.” 
§§ 22575(a), 22577(b)(5). 
29 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1885 (2013). Even Chief Justice Roberts admits to not reading 
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read the policies are unlikely to understand them because they are 
long and often filled with legal jargon.30 And, given the multitude of 
complex ways that companies might use and manipulate informa-
tion, it is difficult—if not impossible—for companies to accurately 
describe their information practices in a concise privacy state-
ment.31 For this reason, privacy policy drafters often employ vague 
or ambiguous language to either  generalize very complex informa-
tion practices or reserve the option to alter specific information 
practices in the future without creating the need to revise the poli-
cy.32 Due to privacy policies’ length, complexity, and incompre-
hensibility, it would prove extremely costly in both time and re-
                                                                                                                            
the fine print he encounters online. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits 
He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, ABA J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_rea
d_the_computer_fine_print/ [https://perma.cc/RDF8-YAEX]. 
30 See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 930 (2013); Solove, supra 
note 29, at 1885; see also Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/technology/personaltech/ 
13basics.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/82TX-M2QQ] (contrasting Facebook’s privacy 
policy length with that of the U.S. Constitution). The FTC has echoed this concern. See 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework 
for Consumers, Businesses, and Policymakers (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2010/12/ftc-staff-issues-privacy-report-offers-framework-
consumers [https://perma.cc/TV5H-WZ36] (noting that the “notice-and-choice model, 
as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers 
typically do not read, let alone understand”); see also United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 
854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (dictum) (“Our access to . . . remote computers is 
governed by a series of private agreements and policies that most people are only dimly 
aware of and virtually no one reads or understands.”). In an amusing anecdote 
exemplifying the point, a company called PC Pitstop promised in its terms of use to pay a 
cash prize to anyone who read the terms and wrote to the company to claim the prize; it 
took months before a consumer noticed the promise and wrote in. See Larry Magrid, It 
Pays to Read License Agreements, PC PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.
asp [https://perma.cc/5LHM-AS8H] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). 
31 See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and 
Externalities, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 436–37 (2011) (“Privacy policies 
for the first-party websites that users interact with are difficult enough for users to 
understand, but when third-party sites enter the mix, the notion of effective privacy 
notice becomes completely untenable.”); Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond 
Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 SUFFOLK U. J. HIGH TECH. 370, 390–98 
(2014). 
32 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of Regulation, 
45 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
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sources for an Internet user to read the privacy policy of every 
website he or she visited.33 
C. Privacy Policies as Contracts? 
Occasionally, websites or online services engage in information 
practices that differ from those described in their privacy policies: 
In contractual terms, they breach the policy.34 But plaintiffs who 
have been the victims of alleged breaches have experienced diffi-
culty alleging viable contract claims.35 This runs contrary to early 
views on the issue: As privacy policies began to emerge, scholar-
ship argued that contract law should play a role in their enforce-
ment.36 This view made sense, especially considering that some 
policies contained statements assuring users that the policies would 
be binding upon them.37 But, as case law on the issue has devel-
                                                                                                                            
33 See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for 
Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274 (2012). Cranor 
estimates that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to read the privacy 
policy of every website he or she visited. Id. This translates to about 54 billion hours and 
$781 million worth of time. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of 
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 540, 560–61 (2008). 
34 See Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and 
in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 91–92 (1999). 
35 See id. 
36 Id. (“As between the website and the user, a privacy policy bears all of the earmarks 
of a contract. . . .”). See generally Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit Promises, 76 
TENN. L. REV. 379 (2009). 
37 See Haynes, supra note 22, at 596 (describing how some websites presented their 
privacy policy terms as binding on the user); Raysman & Brown, supra note 20 (noting 
that “users implicitly acknowledge that they have read and understood the policy and 
agree to be legally bound by it”). Privacy policy enforcement cases follow a track that is 
slightly different from the typical case seeking enforcement of online terms. In many of 
the cases that establish the principles of online contracting, websites or providers of 
online services typically fight to enforce elements of their online terms against consumers. 
See Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up 
to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 179–83 (2007). For example, a user of an 
online service will bring an action against the service in court, and the service will move to 
compel arbitration per the service’s terms of use. See id. at 181–83. Privacy policy 
enforcement cases, on the other hand, typically follow a different trajectory. In those 
cases, a user of a website or online service alleges that the website or service breached its 
privacy policy and that it should be held accountable for breaching a policy term. See 
Haynes, supra note 22, at 606–09. In the first line of cases, users try to escape 
enforceability of a policy term; in the latter, users fight to have policy terms enforced. 
And often, in the first line of cases, users try to claim that no binding agreement exists, 
whereas in the latter, they allege that the privacy policy is indeed a binding agreement. 
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oped, it has become clear that contract law is not as useful a tool for 
addressing privacy policy enforceability as early scholars thought it 
would be.38 
Indeed, courts have eschewed contract theory when analyzing 
privacy policy enforceability.39 Instead of finding that a privacy pol-
icy is binding on one party or the other, courts determine that no 
privacy agreement exists between the parties in the first place.40 In 
these cases, courts take the view that privacy policies are general 
statements of policy rather than enforceable contracts.41 
Privacy policy form contributes to this result. In the online 
space, two basic types of agreements dominate: clickwrap and 
browsewrap.42 Clickwrap agreements are designed to secure a us-
                                                                                                                            
38 See, e.g., Jurin v. Google Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 
(dismissing breach of contract claims arising out of the alleged breach by Google of its 
AdWords policy terms and conditions on the ground that a “broadly stated promise to 
abide by its own policy does not hold Defendant to a contract”); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines 
Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs could not 
maintain suit against Northwest Airlines for breach of its privacy statement because it was 
not a contract); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 
1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (“The usual rule in contract cases is that general 
statements of policy are not contractual.”); see also Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-JWL, 
2007 WL 3120695, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007) (noting that unilateral corporate 
policies generally do not support breach of contract claims). 
39 See Jurin, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. 
40 See Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
41 See In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459, at *6. 
42 The distinction this Note draws between the clickwrap model and the browsewrap 
model is a simplified one, as the line between the two is sometimes blurred. For over a 
decade, courts have had difficulty drawing this distinction and applying it in their cases. 
See, e.g., Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) 
(resolving that the agreement on the Hotels.com website “cannot be neatly characterized 
as either a ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-wrap’”); see also Venkat Balasubramani, The 
“Browsewrap”/”Clickwrap” Distinction Is Falling Apart, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG 
(Feb. 24, 2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/02/the-browsewrap 
clickwrap-distinction-is-falling-apart.htm [https://perma.cc/Z67B-GACD] (summarizing 
recent decisions imprecisely drawing the browsewrap/clickwrap distinction). This is 
because, sometimes, online agreements do not fit neatly into one of these forms. To 
account for this, some authorities have proposed a third online contracting category—
“modified clickwrap”—which include elements of both clickwraps and browsewraps. 
See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910–11 (N.D. Cal. 
2011); Deborah Davis Boykin, Survey of E-Contracting Cases: Browsewrap, Clickwrap, and 
Modified Clickwrap Agreements, 68 BUS. LAW. 257, 257, 259–262 (2012). At least one court 
has abandoned the clickwrap/browsewrap distinction in its decision-making. See Hoffman 
v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 419 N.J. Super. 596, 612 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
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er’s express assent to an agreement.43 Under the clickwrap model, 
a website presents a user with the website’s terms and requires that 
the user assent to those terms by clicking an icon—usually reading 
“I Accept” or “I Agree”—to signal her assent before using the 
website.44 Courts find clickwrap agreements enforceable when us-
ers have knowledge of the presented terms,45 including unread 
terms.46 Courts enforce clickwrap agreements because it is easy to 
identify whether and when a user consents to the agreement 
terms.47 
Privacy policies, however, often take the browsewrap form. 
Browsewrap agreements are visible on a separate webpage accessi-
ble via a hyperlink on the main webpage; a website user may click 
that link to visit, view, and read the site’s terms.48 Users are not 
required to visit and view these agreements before using the web-
site or service,49 but the terms are nonetheless purportedly binding 
on the user.50 Browsewrap agreements do not require that a user 
affirmatively consent to the terms, so in the browsewrap context it 
is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment of assent that the tradi-
                                                                                                                            
2011) (recognizing a division in case law about the extent to which clickwrap features are 
needed to make contractual provisions enforceable, and instead deciding an online 
contract assent issue on notice grounds). But for my purposes here, the simplified 
distinction suffices. 
43 See Rambarran & Hunt, supra note 37, at 174, 177. 
44 See id. 
45 See, e.g., Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(enforcing clickwrap terms against plaintiffs after determining that they had expressed 
assent to the terms on two different occasions by clicking “I Acknowledge” and “I 
Agree”). 
46 See, e.g., Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(enforcing unread clickwrap terms where a plaintiff checked a box acknowledging that he 
had, in fact, read them). 
47 See id. 
48 See Rambarran & Hunt, supra note 37, at 174. Links to browsewrap agreements can 
usually be found at the bottom of a website’s homepage, and often appear in language 
such as “Legal” or “Terms of Use.” Id. at 176; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25, 
at 592. 
49 See Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that the 
user can continue to use the website or its services without visiting the page hosting the 
browsewrap agreement or even knowing that such a webpage exists.”). 
50 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Specht v. 
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 2002); Pollstar v. Gigmania, 
Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
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tional principles of contract formation require.51 Because clear ma-
nifestation of assent is often lacking in the browsewrap context, 
courts’ analysis of whether such agreements are binding between 
the parties “turns on whether a website user has actual or con-
structive knowledge of a [web]site’s terms and conditions prior to 
using the [web]site.”52 A few exceptions notwithstanding, browse-
wrap agreements are usually held not enforceable.53 When a priva-
                                                                                                                            
51 See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 465–66 (2006). 
52 Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B., 2007 WL 4823761, at 
*5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007). 
53 See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“[W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every 
page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take 
any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to 
relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to 
constructive notice.”); Specht, 306 F.3d at 35 (holding that hidden, linked-to license 
agreement terms were not binding on plaintiffs, who lacked notice of and did not assent to 
the terms); Be In, 2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (declining to enforce Terms of Service against 
defendants because, except for the existence of a “Terms of Service” hyperlink, no 
allegations showed that the defendants had notice that mere use of the plaintiff’s website 
amounted to assent to the Terms); Defontes v. Dell Computs. Corp., No. C.A. PC 03-
2636, 2004 WL 253560, at *6 (R.I. Super. Jan. 29, 2004), aff’d, 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009) 
(no manifestation of assent to online terms and conditions that were only accessible via an 
inconspicuous hyperlink at the bottom of Dell’s webpage). The cases in which courts 
enforce browsewrap agreements typically present unique facts in that the parties are 
businesses or are otherwise sophisticated. For example, courts have enforced 
browsewraps in instances where one party continually violates the other’s terms after 
receiving explicit notice of the terms and instructions to cease the violation. See, e.g., Sw. 
Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *7–8 (finding terms binding on defendant after it 
continued to use the plaintiff’s website after receiving a letter ordering it to cease and 
desist the activity that violated the terms); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 
CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (enforcing 
terms when defendant continued to breach terms of use even after receiving a letter from 
plaintiff citing the terms and replying that it did not accept those terms). Other cases 
enforce browsewrap terms where the party against whom the terms are to be enforced 
admitted to having knowledge of the terms. See, e.g., Register.com, 356 F.3d at 429–30; 
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 1, 2005). Browsewrap agreements have also been enforced when factual 
allegations beyond a browsewrap’s terms or presentation support the notion that a user 
had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms. See, e.g., AvePoint, Inc. v. Power 
Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 510–11 (W.D. Va. 2013) (declining to declare a 
browsewrap agreement unenforceable at the motion to dismiss stage when facts alleged 
that the defendant corporation used a fictitious email to download plaintiff’s software, 
which, by its terms, was not to be used for commercial purposes). 
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cy policy takes browsewrap form, it then becomes difficult to find 
that the policy amounts to a binding agreement.54 
In fact, it has been industry practice to draft privacy policies in 
this way so that they do not constitute enforceable agreements.55 
Since privacy policies enforcement is typically sought by users and 
against websites or online services, and because the services can 
include in their terms of use any provisions they would like to be 
binding on the user, websites typically “opt not to provide users 
with another reason to sue them” and assure users that the privacy 
policy is a mere policy statement not intended to be a contract.56 
Another reason that courts reject contract claims for privacy 
policy breaches is because plaintiffs fail to allege cognizable damag-
es resulting from the breach—an essential element of a breach of 
contract claim.57 Proving damages resulting from privacy policy 
breaches is extremely difficult. For example, a claim for mere emo-
tional harm stemming from a loss of privacy is not sufficient as an 
                                                                                                                            
54 See Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5. 
55 IAN C. BALLON, 2 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: A LEGAL TREATISE WITH 
FORMS § 26.14[2] (2d ed. 2014). 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 09-
4567 (RBK/KMW), 2010 WL 1799456, at *10 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (holding that the 
plaintiff could, in principle, assert a breach of contract claim based on privacy policy 
breach, but nevertheless granting defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiff did 
not allege any damages resulting from the alleged breach); Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 
F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling that the plaintiff’s receipt of spam email 
after defendant disclosed her email address in contravention of its privacy policy failed to 
give rise to recoverable damages); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 
2d 299, 325–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss because the 
plaintiff did not allege any damages resulting from the alleged breach); In re Am. Airlines, 
Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs’ 
breach of contract claim on the ground of failure to allege damages); In re Nw. Airlines 
Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 
2004). But see In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172–74 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim where plaintiffs alleged that 
they purchased flowers from a website subject to the Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, and 
Rewards Policies posted on the website and were, as a result, unknowingly enrolled in a 
rewards program that automatically charged them an activation fee). EasySaver 
eventually settled, so it remains unclear whether the court would have enforced the 
privacy policy at issue as a contract later in litigation. See Megan Leonhardt, ProFlowers 
Parent Co. Arranges $38M Deal over Data Policies, LAW360 (June 14, 2012, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/350092/proflowers-parent-co-arranges-38m-deal-over-
data-policies [https://perma.cc/VZF4-RCH6]. 
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allegation of damages.58 Neither is a claim for mere loss of priva-
cy.59 Courts have also held that personally identifiable information 
is not considered property and thus has no compensable value, de-
spite concrete evidence to the contrary.60 
As an alternative to alleging damages, some plaintiffs have at-
tempted to lean on promissory estoppel to have their contract 
claims considered.61 Promissory estoppel is a doctrine providing 
that if a party relies on a promise, the promise can be enforced even 
though the essential elements of a contract (e.g., damages) are not 
met.62 But like plaintiffs alleging pure contract claims, plaintiffs 
alleging promissory estoppel have seen little success, as they are 
                                                                                                                            
58 See, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(rejecting embarrassment and property-based theories of harm as insufficient to state 
claim for breach of contract); Trikas v. Universal Card Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37, 
45–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
59 See Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01399 EJD, 2012 WL 5471149, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (finding that “[m]ere disclosure of such information in and of 
itself, without a showing of actual harm, is insufficient” to support a claim of breach of 
contract); Smith, 2010 WL 1799456, at *10 (“[E]ven assuming that a contract did exist 
between Comcast and Plaintiff that incorporated the above terms, and even assuming that 
Comcast violated those terms, Plaintiff must still plead loss flowing from the breach to 
sustain a claim. . . . He has not done so.”); Cherny, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (“This Court 
finds that the release of an e-mail address, by itself, does not constitute an injury sufficient 
to state a claim under any of the legal theories Cherny asserts.”). 
60 See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[P]ersonal information does not constitute property. . . .”); Stayart v. Google Inc., 783 
F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“[P]laintiff alleges no facts which suggest that 
her name has any commercial value. . . .”); In re JetBlue, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 327 
(“[T]here is absolutely no support for the proposition that the personal information of an 
individual JetBlue passenger had any value for which that passenger could have expected 
to be compensated.”). These conclusions seem to skirt the reality that personal 
information is a highly valued commodity. See, e.g., John T. Soma et al., Corporate Privacy 
Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of 
Financial Assets, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 12–15 (2009) (summarizing the multiple ways 
that personal information is valuable to companies that possess it); Julie Brill, Comm’r, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Proskauer on Privacy 4 (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/101019proskauerspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/79X-
8E3E] (“[T]he collection and use of consumer information . . . underwrites so much of 
the free content available to consumers online.”); see also supra notes 16–19 and 
accompanying text. 
61 See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 694 (1965). 
62 See id. at 698; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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typically unable to show detrimental reliance on the privacy policy 
allegedly breached.63 
The effect of this is that as privacy policies have grown in 
prominence, fewer and fewer cases alleging privacy policy breach 
have been grounded on contract theories. The inutility of contract 
law for enforcing privacy policy promises calls into question the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Notice and Choice model for 
privacy protection. 
II. CONTRACT LAW’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR ADDRESSING 
PRIVACY POLICY BREACHES IS INCONGRUENT WITH 
NOTICE AND CHOICE 
Contract law’s ineffectiveness for addressing privacy policy 
breaches exposes a gap in the Notice and Choice approach. This 
Part addresses that gap. First, the Part describes Notice and Choice 
in terms of what it is, what is intended to do, and why it is consi-
dered important. Then the Part argues that privacy policies’ non-
contractual, non-binding nature is incongruent with the Notice and 
Choice model. 
A. Notice and Choice: The U.S. Approach to Online Privacy 
1. Notice and Choice Generally 
Notice and Choice is the preferred model for protecting indi-
viduals’ privacy online.64 The general thrust of the scheme is that 
                                                                                                                            
63 See, e.g., Azeltine v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-218-TUC-RCC (HCE), 2010 WL 
6511710, at *10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s breach of contract 
claim after determining that plaintiff alleged no reliance on Bank of America’s privacy 
policy); Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 09-
4567(RBK/KMW), 2011 WL 900096, at *10 n.10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011) (“[T]here is no 
evidence . . . that Plaintiff relied on a promise . . . . Therefore, no reasonable jury could 
conclude that a contract existed between the parties based upon a doctrine of promissory 
estoppel.”); see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25, at 595. But see Meyer v. Christie, 
No. 07-2230-JWL, 2007 WL 3120695, at *4–6 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2007) (allowing plaintiff 
to sue for breach of a bank’s privacy policy where the plaintiff had a long-term 
relationship with the bank that led him to rely on the bank to preserve his confidential 
information in accordance with the policy). 
64 Notice and Choice is also sometimes referred to as Notice and Consent. See, e.g., 
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in 
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an entity that collects or uses individuals’ personal information 
must disclose the ways it collects and uses that information and 
must afford individuals an opportunity to choose whether and how 
to transact with the entity.65 Privacy policies are the primary means 
for effectuating Notice and Choice.66 
Valid notice requires that an entity disclose to individuals its 
data practices before collecting or using their personal informa-
tion.67 Adequate disclosure requires providing specific details about 
data collection, use, sharing, security, and other similar elements.68 
Choice is a consent-based theory centered on the notion that con-
sumers should have options with respect to how their collected 
personal information will be used and that they should be able to 
make informed privacy choices based on their personal privacy pre-
ferences.69 
The principles behind Notice and Choice have been evolving 
since the early 1970s, at which time concerns about the potentially 
                                                                                                                            
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON 
THE APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 4 
(2009), https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/ED_SII_On_Notice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72BD-KY3D] (defining “notice and consent”); Fred H. Cate, The 
Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF 
THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 342, 351 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) (addressing notice and 
consent principles for data collection). 
65 See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 64. 
66 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (1998), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/ 
priv-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RS-RF7A] (“In the Internet context, notice can be 
accomplished easily by the posting of an information practice disclosure describing an 
entity’s information practices on a company’s site on the Web.”). 
67 Id. 
68 Some of which might include: 
identification of the entity collecting the data; identification of the 
uses to which the data will be put; identification of any potential 
recipients of the data; the nature of the data collected and the means 
by which it is collected if not obvious (passively, by means of 
electronic monitoring, or actively, by asking the consumer to provide 
the information); whether the provision of the requested data is 
voluntary or required, and the consequences of a refusal to provide 
the requested information; and the steps taken by the data collector to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and quality of the data. 
See id. at 7–8. 
69 Id. at 8. 
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harmful consequences of computer-based technologies incubated.70 
The concept of what is now referred to as Notice and Choice was 
articulated for the first time in a 1977 Privacy Protection Study 
Commission report on mailing lists maintained for commercial 
purposes.71 
In the 1990s, as Internet use became prevalent, issues of online 
privacy and notice began to take center stage. By the mid-1990s, 
both the White House and the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) began to implement key theories of the Notice and 
Choice approach in policymaking efforts.72 Later in the decade, 
                                                                                                                            
70 In 1973, an Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems produced a 
report which advised that private and public sector organizations implementing programs 
for maintaining information about individuals should provide annual public notice of the 
“existence and character” of their programs, and which also offered a list specific 
elements the notice should contain. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 57–58 (1973). A year later, 
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012), which was designed to 
regulate the federal government’s collection and protection of citizens’ personal 
information. The Privacy Act also called for the creation of the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission (“PPSC”), which was charged with analyzing various privacy and record-
keeping practices arising in both the public and commercial sectors. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 
§ 5, 88 Stat. 1896, 1905 (1974) (current version at § 552a). 
71 The PPSC investigated whether parties maintaining mailing lists for commercial 
purposes should be required to de-identify individuals appearing on the list. PRIVACY 
PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 125–54 (July 
1977). The PPSC’s report on the matter recommended that private sector organizations 
that share their mailing lists with third parties should provide notice of the practice to list 
members and to give them the opportunity to opt out of the sharing. Id. at 151. 
72 In 1993, the administration of President Bill Clinton established the Information 
Infrastructure Task Force (“IITF”) to develop policies and programs for promoting the 
development of a new “National Information Infrastructure.” Fred H. Cate, The 
National Information Infrastructure: Policymaking and Policymakers, 6 STAN. L & POL’Y 
REV. 43, 44, 47 (1994). The IITF contained a Privacy Working Group, which included in 
its 1995 report a notice principle requiring that individuals be provided with information 
sufficient to make informed decisions about their privacy. PRIVACY WORKING GRP., 
PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR 
PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION II.B (1995), http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
datacncl/niiprivp.htm [https://perma.cc/T329-39C8]. The White House reinforced this 
principle in its 1997 framework. See WHITE HOUSE, THE FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read. 
html [https://perma.cc/R26K-PZS6] (“Data-gatherers should inform consumer what 
information they are collecting and how they intend to use such data. . . .”). In 1996, the 
FTC undertook a consumer privacy initiative to explore online privacy issues and 
reported that participants in an online privacy workshop agreed that notice of information 
practices is a principle essential to protecting privacy online. See FED. TRADE COMM’N 
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Notice and Choice became the primary online privacy protection 
mechanism. Indeed, in its 1998 report to Congress, the FTC as-
serted that notice is “the most fundamental principle” for protect-
ing privacy online.73 
Notice and Choice remains regulators’ preferred approach: 
Both the White House and the FTC again advocated for Notice 
and Choice when they issued major privacy reports in 2012.74 Why 
do regulators so staunchly support the model? The next Section 
addresses the benefits of and rationales for Notice and Choice. 
2. Why Notice and Choice? 
Since it was first articulated, the principles of Notice and 
Choice have evolved to benefit individuals, businesses, and regula-
tors alike. A primary benefit of Notice and Choice is that it is a self-
regulatory scheme.75 Though guidelines exist for how companies 
should draft their privacy policies and for what those policies 
should include so that valid Notice and Choice is offered,76 compa-
                                                                                                                            
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER 
PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ch. 2 (1996), http://www.ftc. 
gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshop-consumer-privacy-global-information-
infrastructure [https://perma.cc/U2X5-XRLW]. The initiative also concluded that there 
was general agreement among participants that, in addition to providing notice, 
organizations should offer choice and establish safeguards for information they hold. See 
id. 
73 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 7. 
74 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE 35–36, 61–64 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4DY-23R8]; WHITE 
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 
11–18 (2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3U29-BHY7] (highlighting notice’s role, illustrating the challenges 
organizations face in providing in light of emerging technology, and explaining the 
significance of the consumer-company relationship in determining how notice is 
provided). 
75 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and 
Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 489–90 (2015). 
76 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 74, at 61–64; KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY 4–5 (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/ 
files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4WMS-93KT]. 
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nies are largely free to construct their privacy policies as they see 
fit. Notice and Choice is thus seen as a regulatory alternative that is 
more flexible, less expensive to implement, and easier to enforce 
than statutory or administrative regulation.77 
Further, Notice and Choice is designed to put individuals in 
charge of the collection and use of their personal information. By 
placing decision-making power in individuals’ hands, Notice and 
Choice supports individual autonomy.78 With proper notice, indi-
viduals can compare services based on their stated information 
practices and can choose to transact with services based on how 
those practices comport with the individual’s privacy prefe-
rences.79 Personal privacy preferences vary, and through Notice 
and Choice, individuals who place a low value on privacy are able 
to exchange it for goods or information that they value more highly, 
such as free services.80 Individuals’ consent-based relationship has 
the important effect of legitimizing the information practices dis-
closed through Notice and Choice.81 
The individual autonomy that Notice and Choice supports in-
fluences the market for information. Individuals’ ability to make 
decisions on how business’ information practices align with their 
own privacy preferences makes privacy a type of “brand differen-
tiator.”82 In this sense, disclosure through notice encourages pri-
vacy-based competition between online service providers.83 For 
example, a privacy-conscious consumer might opt to transact with 
                                                                                                                            
77 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 682 (2011) (noting that notice “looks cheap” 
and “looks easy”). 
78 See Calo, supra note 77. 
79 See Paula J. Breuning & Mary J. Culnan, Through a Glass Darkly: From Privacy 
Notices to Effective Transparency, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 515, 529 (2016). 
80 See Calo, supra note 77. 
81 MacCarthy, supra note 31, at 440. 
82 See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 72 (“Disclosure by data-gatherers is designed to 
simulate market resolution of privacy concerns by empowering individuals to obtain 
relevant knowledge about why information is being collected, what the information will be 
used for, what steps will be taken to protect that information, the consequences of 
providing or withholding information, and any rights of redress that they may have. Such 
disclosure will enable consumers to make better judgments about the levels of privacy 
available and their willingness to participate.”). 
83 See id. 
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a business that promises to not share her information with third 
parties, rather than one that does not make such a promise.84 
Because of its effect on the market, Notice and Choice serves 
as an appropriate basis for regulation. The FTC is the primary pri-
vacy enforcement authority in the United States, and is the agency 
that polices Notice and Choice.85 Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act86 empowers the FTC to investigate and take en-
forcement action against companies that engage in “unfair” or 
“deceptive” trade practices.87 Under this enforcement authority, 
the FTC investigates businesses that engage in unfair or deceptive 
information practices.88 The FTC has exercised this authority and 
taken enforcement actions against bad actors frequently over the 
past fifteen years.89 Indeed, the FTC’s privacy enforcement power 
extends to a degree that some scholars have dubbed its privacy en-
forcement jurisprudence as a “common law of privacy.”90 
Additionally, Notice and Choice encourages public dialogue 
about information use and protection and thus promotes accounta-
bility. Privacy notices make an entity’s privacy practices public. 
This provides a window through which individuals, businesses, and 
regulators can observe the evolution of information practices with-
                                                                                                                            
84 See id. 
85 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the 
FTC’s role in privacy oversight and enforcement). 
86 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
87 See § 45(a)(1). 
88 See Haynes, supra note 22, at 600. 
89 See, e.g., FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, et al., No. 00-11341-RGS, 2000 WL 34016434 
(D. Mass. July 21, 2000) (settling charges that ToySmart attempted to sell customers’ 
personal information to third parties despite promises to the contrary in the privacy 
policy); Snapchat, Inc., No. 132 3078 (F.T.C. Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3LC-CDCF] 
(settling charges alleging that Snapchat users’ photos did not automatically disappear 
despite a promise to the contrary); Epic Marketplace, Inc., 155 F.T.C. 406 (2013) 
(settling charges that Epic’s failure to disclose its practice of using customers’ browser 
histories to deliver targeted advertising violated Section 5); GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94 
(1999) (settling charges alleging that GeoCities’ privacy policy misrepresented how the 
company used registered visitors’ marketing information); see also Reidenberg et al., supra 
note 75, at 507–08 (indexing recent FTC privacy enforcement actions); Solove & 
Hartzog, supra note 25, at 598–600 (summarizing the FTC’s privacy enforcement 
history). 
90 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 25, at 627. 
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in the industry.91 The resulting discourse sometimes reveals priva-
cy practices that become targets for regulatory enforcement.92 But 
despite its advantages, Notice and Choice faces critiques. The next 
Section addresses those, and offers a new one. 
B. Privacy Policies’ Non-Contractual, Non-Binding Nature Is 
Incongruent with the Notice and Choice Approach 
Privacy advocates often criticize Notice and Choice as ineffec-
tive. Critics argue that Notice and Choice does not actually leave 
people informed: People rarely see, read, or understand the privacy 
policies they encounter,93 so individuals make false assumptions 
about how websites and online services use and protect their in-
formation.94 The model is also considered impractical, because 
there are simply too many privacy policies to keep track of, in light 
of the potentially hundreds of websites an individual might visit on 
any given day.95 And what makes things even more difficult for us-
ers is that privacy policies do not apply to the often-undisclosed 
third parties with whom the policy owner might share user infor-
mation.96 As a result, the downstream flow of user information 
winds through the hands of a “potentially . . . unending chain of 
                                                                                                                            
91 See Breuning & Culnan, supra note 79, at 17. 
92 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., No. 092 3184 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UQZ3-8RUM] (action by privacy advocacy group Electronic Privacy 
Information Center resulting in comprehensive consent decree containing privacy-
enhancing stipulations). 
93 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
94 Two studies reveal this reality. In one, users of online services correctly answered 
questions about the privacy of their online transactions only 30% of the time. Joseph 
Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 
20–21 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/paper=1478214 [https:// 
perma.cc/K22M-5U97]. In another, 64% of survey respondents did not know that a 
supermarket may sell other information about what they buy to other companies. Joseph 
Turow et al., Open to Exploitation: America’s Shoppers Online and Offline 3 (2005), 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc_papers 
[https://perma.cc/LB2H-XXEB]. The same study revealed that 75% of study 
respondents incorrectly believed that the mere presence of a privacy policy meant that a 
website would not disclose users’ information to other entities. Id. 
95 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 77, at 687–89 (describing the “overload 
effect” in online disclosure); Ohm, supra note 30, at 930; see also supra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
96 See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 64, at 5. 
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actors” in a way that is “not only difficult to grasp, but unknowa-
ble.”97 Notice and Choice, then, neither provides individuals with 
adequate knowledge about the consequences of information disclo-
sure nor with mechanisms for ensuring that their information is 
disclosed only in the ways they desire.98 
Further, websites and online services often unilaterally modify 
their privacy policies without notifying users.99 This means that 
even if a user were to follow the privacy statements of the websites 
or services she uses, she may find that terms to which she initially 
agreed no longer apply. This Note adds a new critique: Because 
privacy policies are non-contractual in nature, Notice and Choice 
breaks down when websites or online services execute information 
practices that are different from those stated in their privacy poli-
cies, and in these instances individuals are left without the oppor-
tunity to seek redress on contractual grounds. 
As this Note has shown, the development of case law address-
ing the issue rebuts the early notion that contract law would be the 
most applicable tool for responding to privacy policy breaches.100 
For one reason or another—policy form, plaintiffs’ inability to al-
lege damages, or plaintiffs’ inability to prove reliance—courts are 
unwilling to enforce privacy policies as binding agreements be-
tween a website and a user.101 This suggests that privacy policy 
breaches may be “(effectively) categorically immune” from pri-
vately brought breach of contract claims.102 The consequence is 
that though individuals may vet websites or online services and opt 
to use those whose stated practices match their personal privacy 
                                                                                                                            
97 Id. at 6. 
98 See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Privacy Policies and Privacy Preferences, in SECURITY AND 
USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN USE 448 (Lorrie Faith 
Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005). 
99 See id.; Solove, supra note 29, at 1888–89. 
100 See Killingsworth, supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
101 See discussion supra Section I.C. 
102 Eric Goldman, When Does a Privacy Policy Breach Support a Breach of Contract Claim? 
In re JetBlue, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 16, 2005), http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2005/12/when_does_a_pri.htm [https://perma.cc/83DN-GER3]. This 
stands in contrast with cases involving websites’ terms of use, which are governed by 
contract law. See supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text (discussing browsewrap and 
clickwrap agreements). See generally Lemley, supra note 51 (tracking how contract 
principles have applied to online terms of use). 
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preferences, when a service undertakes information practices that 
are different from those stated, Notice and Choice fails to vindicate 
individuals affected by the broken promise. 
This undermines several of Notice and Choice’s objectives. 
For one, it endangers the individual autonomy that Notice and 
Choice fosters: If both a service’s notice and an individual’s choice 
based on that notice can essentially evaporate with no conse-
quence, the model lacks integrity. And, to the extent that compa-
nies can deviate from their stated information practices without 
facing accountability, companies’ privacy practices cannot effec-
tively serve as a basis for competition in the market.103 
The disconnect between Notice and Choice and contract law is 
important for other reasons as well. For one, individuals benefit 
from services that enable us to work, shop, socialize, and play on-
line, and services gain from the information users provide. In turn, 
services leverage that gain to offer innovative products and fea-
tures.104 But such a relationship is grounded in trust. If individuals 
cannot trust that companies will use their information in the ways 
prescribed in privacy policies, then individuals may cease using the 
services and thus stunt innovation.105 Non-formalized privacy 
agreements open the door for information misuse, and thus user 
mistrust, while formalized privacy contracts could help to secure 
the trust required for the described cycle of benefit to persist. 
Additionally, there is the risk that websites or services will not 
abide by the various guidelines that exist for offering valid Notice 
and Choice.106 Though the FTC’s expanding enforcement power 
                                                                                                                            
103 MacCarthy, supra note 31, at 433, and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
105 In 2012 and 2015, modifications to Instagram’s Terms of Service generated such 
outcry among users that the service revoked the modification. See Dino Grandoni, 
Instagram Regulations Get Tweaked After Uproar—But The Worst Part Is Still There, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2012, 9:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
12/21/instagram-regulations_n_2342509.html [https://perma.cc/V9R4-98GQ]. In 2015, 
negative user response changes in Spotify’s privacy policy led the company to publicly 
apologize and clarify its terms. See Hayley Tsukayama, Spotify Apologizes for Its Newest 
Privacy Policy, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-switch/wp/2015/08/21/spotify-apologizes-for-its-newest-privacy-policy/ [https:// 
perma.cc/K8R5-V7DW]. 
106 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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against companies that commit unfair or deceptive privacy practic-
es likely mitigates this risk,107 early evidence suggested that the in-
dustry failed to adhere to FTC information principles, and that 
other privacy self-regulation schemes (such as privacy certifica-
tions and monitoring) were ineffective.108 Privacy policies’ non-
binding effect means that companies can depart from regulators’ 
guidelines for valid Notice and Choice and escape liability from 
privately brought contract claims. 
One counterargument to this point is that the FTC polices pri-
vacy to a broad extent.109 Although the FTC plays a central role in 
U.S. privacy enforcement, the agency has wielded its powers more 
conservatively than it could, focusing mainly on the most egregious 
offenders’ violations of the most prevalent industry norms.110 
Thus, there might be privacy policy breaches of which the FTC is 
unaware, or instances where the agency declines to initiate investi-
gation or enforcement action. For example, many of the early pri-
vacy policy breach cases resulted from the vignette played out in 
this Note’s introduction. That is, in the aftermath of the 9/11 at-
tacks, some airlines shared passenger information with Department 
of Defense contractors in violation of their privacy policies.111 Giv-
en a similar context today, it is unlikely that government regulators 
would investigate or penalize the airlines for such a breach. In these 
                                                                                                                            
107 See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY REGULATION: 
A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT 3–5 (2005), http://epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z96H-BWB5]; Mary J. Culnan, Protecting Privacy Online: Is Self-
Regulation Working?, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 20, 24–25 (2000); see also ROBERT 
GELLMAN & PAM DIXON, MANY FAILURES: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVACY SELF-
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2011), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6JB-
CP6K]. 
109 See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra 
note 25, at 588–89 (defining the FTC’s privacy enforcement efforts as developing a 
“privacy common law”). 
110 See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2266 (2015). 
111 See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 325–27 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 556 (N.D. 
Tex. 2005); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 
1278459, at *1 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1199 (D.N.D. 2004). 
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instances in which regulators do not act, privacy policies’ non-
binding effect means that individuals affected by breaches are left 
empty-handed. 
This problem with Notice and Choice affects not only individu-
als. To the extent that website owners include risk management 
provisions (e.g., disclaimers, waivers, or arbitration clauses) in 
their privacy policies, policy owners risk these terms being ren-
dered as legally irrelevant (from a contracting perspective) when 
these statements are held to be non-binding.112 When their online 
terms are held unenforceable, websites and services are left go-
verned by less favorable default legal rules and become, essentially, 
“legally naked.”113 
III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR ALIGNING 
NOTICE AND CHOICE AND CONTRACT LAW 
A. Form-Based Solutions 
Form-based solutions might help bridge the gap between No-
tice and Choice and contract law. One solution would be to require 
that privacy policies are drafted as clickwrap agreements. If an in-
dividual manifests affirmative assent to a privacy policy’s terms at 
the outset, it will be easier for her to establish that the terms form a 
binding agreement between her and the service. Likewise, it will be 
more difficult for her to, at a later date, argue that she lacked notice 
of the service’s practices. 
But businesses often view the clickwrap arrangement as ineffi-
cient and impractical, as they fear that website traffic will be nega-
tively affected as a result of users’ impeded access.114 Accordingly, 
regulatory or legislative action would likely be required to affect 
this change. Similar regulatory attempts at term standardization 
                                                                                                                            
112 See Eric Goldman, How Zappos’ User Agreement Failed in Court and Left Zappos 
Legally Naked, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2012/10/how_zappos_user.htm [https://perma.cc/8GKZ-65WX]. 
113 Id. 
114 See BALLON, supra note 56, at 26–27 n.38. 
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have been successful,115 and state law to the same effect could be 
persuasive.116 
Another form-based solution would be to incorporate, by refer-
ence, privacy policies with other terms of use. Because terms of use 
often include risk management provisions such as warranty dis-
claimers, liability limitations, and dispute resolution terms,117 ser-
vices take steps to make these binding on users.118 While privacy 
policies have traditionally been stand-alone documents, if they are 
incorporated with other binding terms by reference, they would 
have stronger binding effect.119 
A shortcoming of either of these suggestions is that individuals 
would still need to prove harm for their breach of contract claims to 
stand. Because proving harm in the privacy context is difficult to 
do,120 this could be a significant hurdle. These approaches could, 
however, help users to establish reliance, which would aid claims 
for promissory estoppel and would at least keep their contract 
claims from being tossed aside based on policy, not contract inter-
pretation.121 
B. A Technical Solution 
Technological tools in development could also bridge the gap 
between Notice and Choice and contract law. For example, a web 
browser plug-in to improve privacy policy usability is presently in 
                                                                                                                            
115 See, e.g., Final Model Privacy Form Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 62,890, 62,897 (Dec. 1, 2009). The Model Privacy Form is used as a safe harbor by 
financial institutions for compliance with certain disclosure requirements when issuing 
their privacy policies. See id. Similarly, the FTC has issued guidance designed to 
encourage and improve the drafting of warranties. See Writing Readable Warranties, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/ 
guidance/writing-readable-warranties [https://perma.cc/YK8G-PTJR]. 
116 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing how CalOPPA’s privacy policy 
mandate imposes a de facto national privacy policy requirement). 
117 See Haynes, supra note 22, at 595–96. 
118 See supra notes 43–47. 
119 See Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267–68 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(finding that because the privacy policy was not incorporated by reference, it did not 
apply in the actual contractual dispute). 
120 See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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development.122 The plug-in’s goal is to provide users with clear, 
complete, and easily digestible information about the privacy poli-
cies of websites they visit. 
The plug-in will take the form of a browser add-on that individ-
uals can download, install, and use.123 Once activated, the plug-in 
will employ natural language and machine learning techniques to 
automatically “read” and interpret the privacy policy of each web-
site a user visits. The plug-in will then present the user with a just-
in-time notice about the website’s privacy practices, as articulated 
in the privacy policy.124 The plug-in will present the user with a 
summary of information about the website’s information practices 
                                                                                                                            
122 The plug-in project is part of the Usable Privacy Project, a collaboration between 
Carnegie Mellon University and Fordham Law’s Center on Law and Information Policy. 
See USABLE PRIVACY POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.usableprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc 
/4A8Z-UDF9]. Because the plug-in is currently in the design and testing phase, there is 
no scholarly literature addressing it yet, but a project member has featured the plug-in on 
her blog. See Margaret Hagan, Designing a Usable Online Privacy Tool, OPEN L. LAB (July 
22, 2015), http://www.openlawlab.com/2015/07/22/designing-a-usable-online-privacy-
tool/ [https://perma.cc/VV7T-D6PJ]. 
123 An example of a similar plug-in is Ghostery’s browser extension, which enables users 
to view which third-party services track them when they visit a particular website and 
block those trackers, if desired. See generally How Ghostery Can Help You, GHOSTERY, 
https://www.ghostery.com/why-ghostery/for-individuals/ [https://perma.cc/X8M5-
NMJE] (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). 
124 A just-in-time privacy notice serves snippets of privacy information as a service’s 
practices call for (e.g., collection of a particular type of data), and are sometimes 
accompanied by a consent request (think of how some mobile apps notify you that they 
would like to use your geolocation data and ask you to authorize such use). The FTC has 
advocated for such just-in-time disclosures and has required them as part of enforcement 
agreements. See, e.g., Decision and Order, Goldenshores Techs., LLC, No. 132 3087 
(F.T.C. Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409 
goldenshoresdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3YV-Q7QJ] (requiring flashlight app creator 
Goldenshores to provide just-in-time notice of how it collects and uses geolocation 
information, and also requiring Goldenshores to obtain “affirmative express consent” to 
the collection and use within the just-in-time notice); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE 
PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 15–16, (2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-
building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201 
mobileprivacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q5E-TK4J] (suggesting that mobile app 
platforms provide just-in-time notices to inform users about the collection of certain 
strains of sensitive information such as photos, contacts, and calendar entries). 
California’s influential Attorney General has also advocated for just-in-time notices. See 
KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM 5 (2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ 
privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWM2-RR3Z]. 
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regarding sharing, collection, use, and other elements. Essentially, 
the plug-in will provide a shorthand version of the privacy policy so 
that users need not read the entire policy itself. The plug-in will 
also highlight options that the policy offers to users (e.g., the op-
portunity to opt out of certain data sharing or collection) and direct 
them on how to exercise those options. Through these features, the 
plug-in will allow users to make informed choices about whether to 
use the website or take action to protect their personal information 
while using it. 
Installation and use of the plug-in could provide evidence of no-
tice of privacy policy terms. This could help privacy policy breach 
plaintiffs establish that they relied on the policy terms, thus aiding 
claims based on a theory of promissory estoppel. The notice pro-
vided by a plug-in could also make it possible for courts to hold that 
the policy terms are binding even if the original policy takes brow-
sewrap form, because, in interpreting browsewraps, courts “focus 
on whether the plaintiff had reasonable notice” of the browsewrap 
terms.125 Courts have held that whether such agreements are bind-
ing depends on the website user’s “actual or constructive know-
ledge” of the terms prior to using the website or service.126 Thus, 
to be bound, the parties need not have an actual “meeting of the 
minds”127—rather, a reasonable communication of the agreement 
terms suffices to render the terms a binding agreement between the 
website and users.128 The “reasonable communication” require-
ment is fulfilled through a combination of reasonable notice of and 
the opportunity to review terms, which serves as a “proxy for the 
offeree’s clear manifestation of assent.”129 In the browsewrap con-
text, “reasonable communication” can be manifested through a 
                                                                                                                            
125 Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 
Mar. 6, 2009) (citing Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). 
126 Id. at *3 n.5. 
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(explaining that though an agreement in a contract can be understood as a meeting of the 
minds, “it is clear that a mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the 
obligation he purports to undertake”). 
128 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(concluding that by using Register’s product, the end user received both “notice and 
presentation of the proposed terms”). 
129 See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1307, 1314 (2005). 
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conspicuous display of the terms.130 A browser plug-in that auto-
matically conveys to users the privacy terms of every website they 
visit could provide sufficient reasonable communication to render 
those terms binding. This would have the effect of making a web-
site or service’s privacy policy statements binding between the ser-
vice and the user, and would make any privacy policy violation a 
breach of the privacy contract. 
Nevertheless, legal and practical issues surround the use of this 
sort of technical tool. For example, courts may not consider the 
plug-in’s notice a valid “reasonable communication” of a web-
site’s privacy terms because the plug-in is an independent technol-
ogy not offered by any website itself. A court might be reluctant to 
give a policy binding effect when its drafter lacked the intent to 
make it binding.131 
Even if courts were to accept the plug-in as a valid “reasonable 
communication,” an issue remains regarding uniform use and ap-
plication. For example, if an individual uses the plug-in to receive 
notice of and establish reliance on the policy, the policy should be 
binding as between the individual and the website or service. But 
the same policy would not be binding as to the website or service 
and an individual who did not download and use the plug-in. 
Another issue relates to plug-in design. Whether due to pur-
posefully open-ended drafting or the use of intentionally vague 
terms, privacy policies are often ambiguous.132 Accordingly, there 
is the risk that the natural language processing and machine learn-
ing tools upon which the plug-in is built may inaccurately interpret 
privacy policy statements, and thus provide users with a less-than-
accurate notice of what the policy means to convey. It would be 
difficult, and possibly unfair, for a court to enforce terms for which 
inaccurate notice was given. 
                                                                                                                            
130 See Rambarran & Hunt, supra note 37, at 176. 
131 See Sulzbach v. Town of Jefferson, 155 N.W.2d 921, 923 (S.D. 1968) (“It is not 
necessary that the parties are conscious of the legal relationship which their words or acts 
give rise to, but it is essential that the acts manifesting assent shall be done 
intentionally.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the 
formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect 
legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”). 
132 See Reidenberg et al., supra note 32. 
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And finally, the issue of harm remains. Even if all the issues 
discussed above resolve in such a way that a user can cite to her use 
of the plug-in to establish notice and reliance, she must still allege 
harm resulting from any breach. But like the form-based solution 
described above, technological tools might at least help users estab-
lish reliance and thus ground their claims in contract theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy policies are the primary mechanism for effectuating the 
Notice and Choice model for protecting privacy online. Though 
they may seem to be contractual, jurisprudence dictates that priva-
cy policies typically lack binding effect between individuals and 
websites or online services. This means that in some circumstances 
where websites or online services engage in information practices 
that differ from those stated in their privacy policies, individual us-
ers lack the opportunity to seek redress on contractual grounds. 
This result is at odds with the objectives of and rationales for No-
tice and Choice. Though form- and technology-based solutions 
might bridge the gap between Notice and Choice and contract law, 
these solutions may not be immediately practicable and questions 
remain as to whether and how they would work, even if they were 
available. 
Overall, this Note shines a light on Notice and Choice and 
presents a new critique of the model. This critique raises questions 
about the model’s efficiency, and more generally, it raises norma-
tive issues about the best means of protecting individual privacy in 
the online context. 
 
